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FIAT MONEY AND THE VALUE OF BINDING PORTFOLIO CONSTRAINTS
MA´RIO R. PA´SCOA, MYRIAN PETRASSI AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
Abstract. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the individual optimality of a
consumption-portfolio plan in an infinite horizon economy where agents are uniformly impatient
and fiat money is the only asset available for inter-temporal transfers of wealth. Next, we show
that fiat money has a positive equilibrium price if and only if for some agent the zero short sale
constraint is binding and has a positive shadow price (now or in the future). As there is always
an agent that is long, it follows that marginal rates of inter-temporal substitution never coincide
across agents. That is, monetary equilibria are never full Pareto efficient. We also give a counter-
example illustrating the occurrence of monetary bubbles under incomplete markets in the absence
of uniform impatience.
Keywords: Binding credit constraints, Fundamental value of money, Asset pricing bubbles.
JEL classification: D50, D52.
1. Introduction
The uniform impatience assumption (see Herna´ndez and Santos (1996, Assumption C.3) or Magill
and Quinzii (1996, Assumptions B2, B4)), together with borrowing constraints, is a usual require-
ment for existence of equilibrium in economies with infinite lived agents. This condition is satisfied
whenever preferences are separable over time and across states so long as (i) the intertemporal dis-
counted factor is constant, (ii) individual endowments are uniformly bounded away from zero, and
(iii) aggregate endowment is uniformly bounded from above.
The assumption of uniform impatience has important implications for asset pricing as it rules out
speculation in assets in positive net supply for deflator processes in the non-arbitrage pricing kernel,
yielding finite present values of aggregate wealth, as Santos and Woodford (1997) showed. The
well-known example of a positive price of fiat money by Bewley (1980) highlighted the importance
of the finiteness of the present value of aggregate wealth.
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What happens if we use as deflators the agents’ inter-nodes marginal rates of substitution? These
deflators may fail to be in the asset pricing kernel when some portfolio constraints are binding.1
For these Kuhn-Tucker deflators, assets in positive net supply may be priced above the series of
deflated dividends and the difference may be due to the presence of shadow prices rather than to
a bubble. Gime´nez (2007) already made this comment and Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez
(2008) worked along these lines when addressing the pricing of long-lived collateralized assets.
To consider a simple and provocative case, we look, as in Bewley (1980), at economies with a
single asset, paying no dividends and in positive net supply. As usual, we call this asset fiat money
(or simply money), although we are quite aware that we are just looking at its role as a store of
value, i.e. as an instrument to transfer wealth across time and states of nature. In this context and
under uniform impatience, we show that money can and will only be positively valued as a result
of agents’ desire to take short positions that they cannot. That is, under uniform impatience, the
positive price of money must be due to the presence of shadow prices of binding constraints.
This result does not collide with the example by Bewley (1980) or the results by Santos and
Woodford (1997). It complements these results. Under uniform impatience, a positive price of
money implies that the present value of the aggregate wealth must be infinite for any deflator in
the asset pricing kernel. Without uniform impatience, it would only imply an infinite supremum for
the present value of aggregate wealth, when all deflators in that kernel are considered. However,
for any Kuhn-Tucker deflator process of a certain agent, the present value of the endowments of
this agent is finite, but this deflator may fail to be in the asset pricing kernel (when this agent has
binding portfolio constraints) or the present value of aggregate wealth may fail to be finite (when
the deflator is not the same for all agents and uniform impatience does not hold).
In Bewley’s (1980) example, the two uniformly impatient agents were not allowed to take short
positions and the economy had no uncertainty. The positive price of money was a bubble for the
unique deflator process in the asset pricing kernel and for this deflator the present value of aggregate
wealth was infinite. However, the zero short-sales constraint was binding infinitely often. Thus, for
the Kuhn-Tucker deflator process of each agent, the fundamental value of money was positive,
consisting of the shadow prices of debt constraints.
Hence, we obtain a result that may seem surprising: credit frictions create room for welfare
improvements through transfers of wealth that become possible when money has a positive price.
However, monetary equilibria are always Pareto inefficient. Otherwise, by definition, agents’ rates
1Notice that under inequality constraints on portfolios, non-arbitrage (from one node to its immediate successors)
is equivalent to the existence of a positive vector of state prices solving a linear system of inequalities relating asset
prices and returns (see Jouini and Kallal (1995) or Araujo, Fajardo and Pa´scoa (2005)). The state prices that make
all inequalities hold as equalities constitute the kernel of the linear operator that defines the system, but there may
be other solutions (for example, those given by the Kuhn-Tucker multiplers).
FIAT MONEY AND THE VALUE OF BINDING PORTFOLIO CONSTRAINTS 3
of intertemporal substitution would coincide. However, as money is in positive net supply, at least
one agent must go long, having a zero shadow price. Thus, the shadow prices of all agents should
be zero and, therefore, the price of money could not be positive.
To clarify our results, we prove that when money has a positive value, there exists a deflator,
but not one of the Kuhn-Tucker deflators, under which the discounted value of aggregated wealth is
infinite and a pure bubble appears. That is, in our framework (that includes Bewley (1980) model)
it is always possible to interpret monetary equilibrium as a bubble. However, when we focus on
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers—deflators that make financial Euler conditions compatible with physical
Euler conditions—the positive price of money is always a consequence of a positive fundamental
value.
We close the paper with an example of a stochastic economy that does not satisfy the uniform
impatience assumption. Money is positive valued in equilibrium, although shadow prices of zero
short-sale constraints are equal to zero. For the Kuhn-Tucker deflator processes of both agents,
aggregate wealth has a finite present value.
Our main mathematical tool is a duality approach to dynamic programming problems that was
already used in the context of long-lived collateralized assets by Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez
(2008). This approach allows us to characterize non-interior solutions and the respective Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier processes. A recent related paper by Rinco´n-Zapatero and Santos (2008) addresses
the uniqueness of this multiplier process and the differentiability of the value function, without
imposing the usual interiority assumptions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes uniform impatience. Section 3 presents
the basic model. In Section 4, we develop the necessary mathematical tools: a duality theory of
individual optimization. In Section 5 we define the concepts of fundamental value of money and
asset pricing bubbles. Finally, Section 6 presents the results on monetary equilibria and Section 7
an example of monetary equilibrium in an economy without uniform impatience. Some proofs are
left to the Appendix.
2. Characterizing uniform impatience when utilities are separable
In this section, we recall the assumption of uniform impatience and characterize it for separable
utilities in terms of intertemporal discount factors. As a consequence, we show that the uniform
impatience assumption does not hold for agents with hyperbolic intertemporal discounting (see
Laibson (1998)).
Consider an infinite horizon discrete time economy where the set of dates is {0, 1, . . .} and there
is no uncertainty at t = 0. Given a history of realizations of the states of nature for the first t − 1
4 MA´RIO R. PA´SCOA, MYRIAN PETRASSI AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
dates, with t ≥ 1, st = (s0, . . . , st−1), there is a finite set S(st) of states that may occur at date t. A
vector ξ = (t, st, s), where t ≥ 1 and s ∈ S(st), is called a node. The only node at t = 0 is denoted
by ξ0. Let D be the event-tree, i.e., the set of all nodes.
Given ξ = (t, st, s) and µ = (t′, st′ , s′), we say that µ is a successor of ξ, and we write µ ≥ ξ,
if t′ ≥ t and st′ = (st, s, . . . ). We write µ > ξ to say that µ ≥ ξ but µ 6= ξ and we denote by
t(ξ) the date associated with a node ξ. Let ξ+ = {µ ∈ D : (µ ≥ ξ) ∧ (t(µ) = t(ξ) + 1)} be
the set of immediate successors of ξ. The (unique) predecessor of ξ > ξ0 is denoted by ξ− and
D(ξ) := {µ ∈ D : µ ≥ ξ} is the sub-tree with root ξ. The set of nodes with date T in D(ξ) is
denoted by DT (ξ), and DT (ξ) =
⋃T
k=t(ξ)Dk(ξ) denotes the set of successors of ξ with date less than
or equal to T . When ξ = ξ0 notations above will be shorten to DT and DT .
At any node ξ ∈ D, a finite set of perishable commodities is available for trade, L. There is a
finite set of infinite-lived agents, H. Each agent h ∈ H has at any ξ ∈ D a physical endowment
wh(ξ) ∈ RL+ and has preferences over consumption plans, (x(ξ); ξ ∈ D) ∈ RL×D+ , which are repre-
sented by a function Uh : RL×D+ → R+ ∪ {+∞}. Aggregated physical endowments at a node ξ are
given by W (ξ) ∈ RL++.
Assumption 1 (Separability of preferences). For any agent h ∈ H, the utility function
Uh((x(ξ); ξ ∈ D)) = ∑ξ∈D uh(ξ, x(ξ)), where for any ξ ∈ D, uh(ξ, ·) : RL+ → R+ is a continuous,
concave and strictly increasing function. Also,
∑
ξ∈D u
h(ξ,W (ξ)) is finite.
Assumption 2 (Uniform impatience). There are pi ∈ [0, 1) and (∆(µ);µ ∈ D) ∈ RL×D+ such
that, given a consumption plan (x(µ);µ ∈ D), with 0 ≤ x(µ) ≤W (µ), for any h ∈ H, we have
uh (ξ, x(ξ) + ∆(ξ)) +
∑
µ>ξ
uh(µ, pi′ x(µ)) >
∑
µ≥ξ
uh(µ, x(µ)), ∀ξ ∈ D, ∀pi′ ≥ pi.
Moreover, there is κ > 0 such that, wh(ξ) ≥ κ∆(ξ) > 0, ∀ξ ∈ D.
The requirements of impatience above depend on both preferences and physical endowments.
As particular cases we obtain the assumptions imposed by Herna´ndez and Santos (1996)—for any
µ ∈ D, ∆(µ) = W (µ)—and Magill and Quinzii (1994, 1996)—initial endowments are uniformly
bounded away from zero by a bundle w ∈ RL++, and ∆(µ) = (1, 0, . . . , 0), ∀µ ∈ D.
Our characterization of uniform impatience is,
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, that (W (ξ); ξ ∈ D) is a bounded consumption
plan and that there is w ∈ RL+ \ {0} such that, wh(ξ) ≥ w, ∀ξ ∈ D. Moreover, assume that there
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exists a function uh : RL+ → R+ such that, for any ξ ∈ D, uh(ξ, ·) ≡ βht(ξ)ρh(ξ)uh(·), where βht(ξ) is
a strictly positive discount factor and ρh(ξ) denotes the probability to reach node ξ, which satisfies
ρh(ξ) =
∑
µ∈ξ+ ρ
h(µ), with ρh(ξ0) = 1.
For each t ≥ 0, let aht = 1βht
∑+∞
r=t+1 β
h
r . Then, the function U
h satisfies uniform impatience (As-
sumption 2) if and only if the sequence (aht )t≥0 is bounded.
Proof. Assume that (W (ξ); ξ ∈ D) is a bounded consumption plan. That is, there is W ∈ RL+ such
that, W (ξ) ≤ W, ∀ξ ∈ D. If (aht )t≥0 is bounded, then there exists ah > 0 such that, aht ≤ ah, for
each t ≥ 0. Also, since F := {x ∈ RL+ : x ≤W} is compact, the continuity of uh assures that there is
pi ∈ (0, 1) such that uh(x)−uh(pi′ x) ≤ uh(W+w)−uh(W )
2ah
, ∀x ∈ F, ∀pi′ ≥ pi. Thus, uniform impatience
follows by choosing κ = 1 and ∆(ξ) = w, ∀ξ ∈ D. Indeed, given a plan (x(µ);µ ∈ D) ∈ RL×D+ such
that, x(µ) ≤W (µ) ∀µ ∈ D, the concavity of uh assures that, for any ξ ∈ D and pi′ ≥ pi,
∑
µ>ξ
βht(µ)ρ
h(µ)uh(x(µ))−
∑
µ>ξ
βht(µ)ρ
h(µ)uh(pi′x(µ)) ≤ β
h
t(ξ)a
h
t
2ah
ρh(ξ)
(
uh(W + w)− uh(W )
)
< βht(ξ)ρ
h(ξ)uh(x(ξ) + ∆(ξ))− βht(ξ)ρh(ξ)uh(x(ξ)).
Reciprocally, suppose that uniform impatience property holds. Then, there are (pi, κ) ∈ [0, 1) ×
R++ and (∆(µ);µ ∈ D) ∈ RL×D+ satisfying, for any ξ ∈ D, wh(ξ) ≥ κ∆(ξ), such that, given
(x(µ);µ ∈ D) ∈ RL×D+ with x(µ) ≤W (µ), for all µ ∈ D, we have that, for any node ξ ∈ D,
1
βht(ξ)ρ
h(ξ)
∑
µ>ξ
βht(µ)ρ
h(µ)uh(x(µ))−
∑
µ>ξ
βht(µ)ρ
h(µ)uh(pix(µ))
 < uh(x(ξ) + ∆(ξ))− uh(x(ξ)).
It follows that, for any node ξ,
1
βht(ξ)ρ
h(ξ)
∑
µ>ξ
βht(µ)ρ
h(µ)uh(w)−
∑
µ>ξ
βht(µ)ρ
h(µ)uh(piw)
 < uh((1 + 1
κ
)
W
)
.
Therefore, we conclude that, for any ξ ∈ D,
1
βht(ξ)
(
uh(w)− uh(piw)) +∞∑
t=t(ξ)+1
βht < u
h
((
1 +
1
κ
)
W
)
,
which implies that the sequence (aht )t≥0 is bounded. 
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, if intertemporal discount factors are constant, i.e. ∃λh ∈
R++ :
βht(ξ)+1
βh
t(ξ)
= λh, ∀ξ ∈ D, then both λh < 1 and aht = λ
h
1−λh , for each t ≥ 0. In this case, the
utility function Uh satisfies the uniform impatience condition.
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However, even with bounded plans of endowments, uniform impatience is a restrictive condition
when intertemporal discount factors are time varying. For instance, if we consider hyperbolic in-
tertemporal discount factors, that is, βht = (1 + θt)
− τθ , where (τ, θ)  0, then the function Uh, as
defined in the statement of Proposition 1, satisfies Assumption 1 and the sequence (aht )t≥0 goes to
infinity as t increases. Therefore, in this case, uniform impatience does not hold.
3. A monetary model with uniform impatience agents
We assume that there is only one asset, money , that can be traded along the event-tree. Although
this security does not deliver any physical payment, it can be used to make intertemporal transfers.
Let q = (q(ξ); ξ ∈ D) be the plan of monetary prices. We assume that money is in positive net
supply that does not disappear from the economy neither deteriorates. Denote money endowments
at a node ξ ∈ D by eh(ξ) ∈ R+. We denote by zh(ξ) ∈ R+ the quantity of money that h negotiates
at ξ. Let p(ξ) := (p(ξ, l); l ∈ L) be the commodity price at ξ ∈ D and p = (p(ξ); ξ ∈ D).
Given prices (p, q), let Bh(p, q) be the choice set of agent h ∈ H, that is, the set of plans
(x, z) := ((x(ξ), z(ξ)); ξ ∈ D) ∈ RL×D+ ×RD+ , such that, at any ξ ∈ D, the following budget constraint
holds,
ghξ (y
h(ξ), yh(ξ−); p, q) := p(ξ)
(
xh(ξ)− wh(ξ))+ q(ξ) (zh(ξ)− eh(ξ)− zh(ξ−)) ≤ 0,
where yh(ξ) = (xh(ξ), zh(ξ)), yh(ξ−0 ) := (x
h(ξ−0 ), z
h(ξ−0 ) = 0.
Agent’s h individual problem is to choose a plan yh = (xh, zh) in Bh(p, q) in order to maximize
her utility function Uh : RL×D+ → R+ ∪ {+∞}.
Definition 1.
An equilibrium for our economy is given by a vector of prices (p, q) jointly with individual plans(
(xh, zh);h ∈ H), such that,
(a) For each h ∈ H, the plan (xh, zh) ∈ Bh(p, q) is optimal at prices (p, q).
(b) Physical and asset markets clear,∑
h∈H
(
xh(ξ); zh(ξ)
)
=
(
W (ξ),
∑
h∈H
(
eh(ξ) + zh(ξ−)
))
.
Note that, a pure spot market equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium with zero monetary price, always
exists provided that preferences satisfy Assumption 1 above.
4. Duality theory for individual optimization
In this section, we determine necessary and sufficient conditions for individual optimality.
Some previous definitions and notations are necessary. By normalization, we assume that prices
(p, q) belong to P := {(p, q) ∈ RL×D+ × RD+ :
∑
l∈L p(ξ, l) + q(ξ) = 1, ∀ξ ∈ D}. Given a concave
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function f : X ⊂ RL → R ∪ {−∞} the super-differential at x ∈ X, denoted by ∂f(x), is defined as
the set of vectors p ∈ RL such that, for all x′ ∈ X, f(ξ, x′)− f(ξ, x) ≤ p(x′ − x).
Definition 2.
Given (p, q) ∈ P and yh = (xh, zh) ∈ Bh(p, q), we say that (γh(ξ); ξ ∈ D) ∈ RD+ constitutes a
family of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers (associated to yh) if there exist, for each ξ ∈ D, super-gradients
u′(ξ) ∈ ∂uh(ξ, xh(ξ)) such that,
(a) For every ξ ∈ D, γh(ξ) ghξ (yh(ξ), yh(ξ−); p, q) = 0.
(b) The following Euler conditions hold,
γh(ξ)p(ξ)− u′(ξ) ≥ 0, (γh(ξ)p(ξ)− u′(ξ)) xh(ξ) = 0,
γh(ξ)q(ξ)−
∑
µ∈ξ+
γh(µ)q(µ) ≥ 0,
γh(ξ)q(ξ)− ∑
µ∈ξ+
γh(µ)q(µ)
 zh(ξ) = 0.
(c) The following transversality condition holds: limT→+∞
∑
ξ∈DT
γh(ξ)q(ξ)zh(ξ) = 0.
Since we only know that, for any plan (p, q) ∈ P, the choice set Bh(p, q) belongs to RD×L+ ×RD+ ,
it is not obvious that a plan of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers will exist. Thus, we need to develop a
duality theory. As individual admissible plans are determined by countably many inequalities, we
will construct Kuhn-Tucker multipliers using the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem for Euclidean spaces.
First of all, we want to note that, when Kuhn-Tucker multipliers exist and are used as intertem-
poral deflators, the discounted value of individual endowments is finite.
Proposition 2. (Finite discounted value of individual endowments)
Fix a plan (p, q) ∈ P and yh = (xh, zh) ∈ Bh(p, q) such that Uh(xh) < +∞. If Assumption
1 holds then for any family of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated to yh, (γh(ξ); ξ ∈ D), we have∑
ξ∈D γ
h(ξ)
(
p(ξ)wh(ξ) + q(ξ)eh(ξ)
)
< +∞.
Proposition 3. (Necessary and sufficient conditions for individual optimality)
Under Assumption 1, fix a plan (p, q) ∈ P and yh = (xh, zh) ∈ Bh(p, q). If Uh(xh) < +∞
and yh is an optimal plan for agent h ∈ H at prices (p, q), then there exists a family of Kuhn-
Tucker multipliers associated to yh. Reciprocally, if there exists a family of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers
associated to yh, then yh is an optimal plan for agent h at prices (p, q).
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5. Frictions induced by debt constraints, fundamental values and bubbles
In a frictionless world, that is, where financial debt constraints are non-saturated, there are two
(equivalent) definitions of the fundamental value of an asset. The fundamental value is either (1)
equal to the discounted value of future deliveries that an agent will receive for one unit of the asset
that she buys and keeps forever; or, (2) equal to the discounted value of rental services, which
coincides with the value of deliveries, given the absence of any friction associated to debt constraint.
These concepts do not coincide when frictions are allowed. Thus, we adopt the second definition,
that includes the role that money has: it allows for intertemporal transfers, although its deliveries
are zero.
Proposition 4.
Under Assumption 1, given an equilibrium
[
(p, q); ((xh, zh);h ∈ H)], at each node ξ ∈ D and
for any h ∈ H, q(ξ) ≥ F (ξ, q, γh), where γh := (γh(ξ); ξ ∈ D) denotes the agent’s h plan of
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers and
F (ξ, q, γh) :=
1
γh(ξ)
∑
µ∈D(ξ)
γh(µ)q(µ)− ∑
ν∈µ+
γh(ν)q(ν)
 ,
is the fundamental value of money at ξ ∈ D.
Note that the rental services that one unit of money gives at µ ∈ D are equal to the difference
between the amount of resources that an agent pays at µ to have one unit of money, less the amount
of resources (discounted to node µ) that the agent receives at nodes ν ∈ µ+ when he sells this unit
of money. That is, q(µ)−∑ν∈µ+ γh(ν)γh(µ)q(ν). Thus, the fundamental value of money at a node ξ, as
was defined above, coincides with the discounted value of (unitary) future rental services.
On the other hand, under Assumption 1, it follows from Propositions 3 and 4 that, given an
equilibrium
[
(p, q); ((xh, zh);h ∈ H)], there are, for each agent h ∈ H, Kuhn-Tucker multipliers
(γh(ξ); ξ ∈ D), such that,
q(ξ) = F (ξ, q, γh) + lim
T→+∞
∑
{µ≥ξ:t(µ)=T}
γh(µ)
γh(ξ)
q(µ),
where the second term in the right hand side is called the bubble component of q(ξ). When q(ξ) >
F (ξ, q, γh) we say that fiat money has a bubble at ξ under γh.
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Finally, we say that debt constraints induce frictions over agent h in D˜ ⊂ D if the plan of shadow
prices (ηh(µ); µ ∈ D˜) that is defined implicitly, at each µ ∈ D˜, by the conditions:
0 = ηh(µ)zh(µ),
γh(µ)q(µ) =
∑
ν∈µ+
γh(ν)q(ν) + ηh(µ),
is different from zero.
Note that the fundamental value of money, F (ξ, q, γh), can be expressed in terms of the shadow
prices (ηh(µ); µ ∈ D) as F (ξ, q, γh) = 1
γh(ξ)
∑
µ∈D(ξ) η
h(µ). In other words, the rental services that
one unit of money gives are measured by the shadow prices of zero short-sales constraints.
6. Characterizing monetary equilibria
Let us see under what conditions can we have equilibria with positive price of money, also called
monetary equilibria.
Theorem 1.
Suppose that Assumptions 1 holds and fix an equilibrium
[
(p, q); ((xh, zh);h ∈ H)]. If Assumption
2 holds and at some node ξ ∈ D the monetary price q(ξ) is strictly positive, then debt constraints
induce frictions over each agent in D(ξ). Reciprocally, if debt constraints induce frictions over some
agent in the sub-tree D(ξ), then q(ξ) > 0.
Observation. This theorem is related to the result in Santos and Woodford (1997), Theorem 3.3,
that asserted that, under uniform impatience, assets in positive net supply are free of price bubbles
for deflators, in the asset pricing kernel, that yield finite present values of aggregate wealth. How-
ever, we may have a positive price of money due to the presence of shadow prices in the Kuhn-Tucker
deflator process (and, in this case, for any kernel deflator, the present value of aggregate wealth will
be infinite).
Proof of the Theorem 1.
By definition, if for some h ∈ H, (ηh(µ);µ ≥ ξ) = 0 then F (ξ, q, γh(ξ)) = 0. Thus, a monetary
equilibrium is a pure bubble. However, under uniform impatience (Assumption 2) bubbles are ruled
out in equilibrium for the deflators given by the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. Indeed, at each ξ ∈ D, and
for any agent h ∈ H, q(ξ)zh(ξ) ≥ 0. Therefore, by the impatience property, 0 ≤ (1− pi)q(ξ)zh(ξ) ≤
p(ξ)∆(ξ). Moreover, as money is in positive net supply, it follows that
(
q(ξ)
p(ξ)∆(ξ) ; ξ ∈ D
)
is uniformly
bounded. Since by Proposition 2, for any h ∈ H, ∑ξ∈D γh(ξ)p(ξ)wh(ξ) < +∞, it follows from
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Assumption 2 that bubbles do not arise in equilibrium. Therefore, we conclude that, if q(ξ) > 0
then (ηh(µ);µ ≥ ξ) 6= 0, for all h ∈ H.
Reciprocally, by definition, if debt constraints induce frictions over some agent in the sub-tree
D(ξ), then the fundamental value of money at ξ is strictly positive, which implies that q(ξ) > 0. 
Corollary 1.
Under Assumption 1, given a monetary equilibrium
[
(p, q); ((xh, zh);h ∈ H)], there always exists
a plan of non-arbitrage deflators in the asset-pricing kernel, (ν(ξ); ξ ∈ D), for which the price of
money is a pure bubble.
Proof. Fix an agent h ∈ H. It follows from Proposition 3 that there is a family of Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers associated with the plan (xh, zh), namely (γh(ξ); ξ ∈ D). Also, by Euler conditions, if
q(ξ) = 0 at some node ξ ∈ D, then q(µ) = 0, ∀µ > ξ.
Define ν := (ν(ξ) : ξ ∈ D) by ν(ξ0) = 1, and
ν(µ) = 1, ∀ξ ∈ D, ∀µ > ξ : q(ξ) = 0,
ν(µ)
ν(ξ)
=
γh(µ)
γh(ξ)− ηh(ξ)q(ξ)
, ∀ξ ∈ D, ∀µ ∈ ξ+ : q(ξ) > 0.
Euler conditions on (γh(ξ); ξ ∈ D) imply that, for each ξ ∈ D, ν(ξ)q(ξ) = ∑µ∈ξ+ ν(µ)q(µ). There-
fore, using the plan of deflators ν, financial Euler conditions hold and the positive price of money
is a bubble. 
Under Assumption 2, the plan
(
q(ξ)
p(ξ)∆(ξ) ; ξ ∈ D
)
is uniformly bounded along the event-tree and,
therefore, the existence of a bubble for a plan of deflators (ν(ξ); ξ ∈ D) implies that the deflated
value of future individual endowments,
∑
ξ∈D ν(ξ)p(ξ)w
h(ξ), has to be infinite for any agent h ∈ H.
This plan of deflators, which is incompatible with physical Euler conditions, is compatible with
zero shadow prices and our observation conforms to the results by Santos and Woodford (1997): a
monetary bubble may only occur, for a plan of deflators in the asset pricing kernel, if the associated
present value of aggregate wealth is infinite.
Some remarks:
◦ Adding an (unrestricted) asset that pays returns would not necessarily make fiat money useless,
since the degree of market incompleteness may still leave room for a spanning role of money. On the
other hand, if we allow for an increasing number of non-redundant securities in order to assure that
aggregated wealth can be replicated by the deliveries of a portfolio trading plan, money will have
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zero price. Indeed, in this context, independently of the non-arbitrage deflator, the discounted value
of future wealth must be finite (see Santos and Woodford (1997)). Therefore, if money has a positive
value, we obtain a contradiction, since as we say above, we may always construct a deflator in the
asset pricing kernel under which the discounted value of aggregated wealth is infinite. However, the
issue of new assets in order to achieve that property of the financial markets can be too costly.
◦ In models addressing the role of money as a medium of exchange, starting with Clower (1967), it is
instead liquidity frictions that become crucial. Grandmont and Youne`s (1972) consider a temporary
equilibrium model where fiat money is the only store of value and prove that equilibrium exists as a
consequence of some ”viscosity” in the exchange process. In a recent work along those lines, but in
the general equilibrium context, Santos (2006) showed that monetary equilibrium only arises when
cash-in-advance constraints are binding infinitely often for all agents. Also, in a cashless economy
with zero short-sales restrictions, Gime´nez (2007) provided examples of monetary bubbles that can
be reinterpreted as positive fundamental values.
Next, we show that given a monetary equilibrium allocation, there is always another feasible
allocation that makes some agent better off without hurting others, that is, monetary equilibria are
inefficient in the Pareto sense. This claim is shown by noticing that, in our context, Pareto efficiency
requires marginal rates of inter-temporal substitution to be equal across agents.2
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1, if for each ξ ∈ D, uh(ξ, ·) is differentiable in RL++ and
lim‖x‖min→0+ ∇uh(ξ, x) = +∞, then any monetary equilibrium is Pareto inefficient.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an efficient monetary equilibrium. Since lim‖x‖min→0+ ∇uh(ξ, x) =
+∞, ∀(h, ξ) ∈ H×D, all agents have interior consumption along the event-tree. Positive net supply
of money implies that there exists, at each ξ ∈ D, at least one lender. Therefore, by the efficiency
property, it follows that all individuals have zero shadow prices. Therefore, it follows from the
transversality condition of Definition 2, jointly with Proposition 4, that q(ξ) = 0 for any node
ξ ∈ D. A contradiction. 
2More formally, an allocation ((xi(ξ))ξ∈D, i ∈ H) is Pareto efficient if for each agent i ∈ H it maximize the
utility of the agent, U i((xi(ξ))ξ∈D) among the allocations ((xj(ξ))ξ∈D, j ∈ H) that satisfies both Uj((xj(ξ))ξ∈D) ≥
U i((xj(ξ))ξ∈D), ∀j 6= i; and
∑
j∈H x
j(ξ) ≤ W (ξ), ∀ξ ∈ D. Under the conditions of Proposition 5, the necessary
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problems imply that the marginal rates of intertemporal substitution must be equal
across agents.
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The inefficiency of monetary equilibrium was previously addressed in the context of temporary
equilibrium models with cash-in-advance constraints by Grandmont and Youne`s (1973). Also, as
was analyzed by Hahn (1973) (see also Starrett (1973)), the existence of transactions costs may lead
to inefficient allocations.
7. Monetary equilibrium in the absence of uniform impatience
To highlight the role of uniform impatience we adapt Example 1 in Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-
Mart´ınez (2008) in order to prove that without uniform impatience on preferences money may have
a bubble for deflators that give a finite present value of aggregate wealth, even for Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers. Essentially this happens because individuals will believe that, as time goes on, the
probability that the economy may fall in a path in which endowments increase without an upper
bound converges to zero fast enough. Notice that it must be the case that the supremum over all
asset pricing kernel deflators of the present value of aggregate wealth is infinite (see Santos and
Woodford (1997), Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2).
Example. Assume that each ξ ∈ D has two successors: ξ+ = {ξu, ξd}. There are ‘two agents
H = {1, 2} and only one commodity. Each h ∈ H has physical endowments (wh(ξ))ξ∈D, receives
financial endowments eh ≥ 0 only at the first node, and has preferences represented by the utility
function Uh(x) =
∑
ξ∈D β
t(ξ)ρh(ξ)x(ξ), where β ∈ (0, 1) and the plan (ρh(ξ))ξ∈D ∈ (0, 1)D satisfies
ρ(ξ0) = 1, ρh(ξ) = ρh(ξd) + ρh(ξu) and
ρ1(ξu) =
1
2t(ξ)+1
ρ1(ξ), ρ2(ξu) =
(
1− 1
2t(ξ)+1
)
ρ2(ξ).
Suppose that agent h = 1 is the only one endowed with the asset, i.e. (e1, e2) = (1, 0) and that,
for each ξ ∈ D,
w1(ξ) =
 1 + β−t(ξ) if ξ ∈ Ddu,1 otherwise ; w2(ξ) =
 1 + β−t(ξ) if ξ ∈ {ξd0} ∪Dud,1 otherwise ;
where Ddu is the set of nodes attained after going down followed by up, that is, Ddu = {η ∈ D :
∃ξ, η = (ξd)u } and Dud denotes the set of nodes reached by going up and then down, that is,
Dud = {η ∈ D : ∃ξ, η = (ξu)d }.
Agents will use positive endowment shocks in low probability states to buy money and sell it later
in states with higher probabilities. Let prices be (p(ξ), q(ξ))ξ∈D = (βt(ξ), 1)ξ∈D and suppose that
consumption of agent h is given by xh(ξ) = wh
′
(ξ), where h 6= h′. It follows from budget constraints
that, at each ξ, the portfolio of agent h must satisfy zh(ξ) = βt(ξ)(wh(ξ)−wh′(ξ)) + zh(ξ−), where
zh(ξ−0 ) := e
h and h 6= h′.
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Thus, the consumption allocations above jointly with the portfolios (z1(ξ0), z1(ξu), z1(ξd)) =
(1, 1, 0) and (z2(ξ))ξ∈D = (1 − z1(ξ))ξ∈D are budget and market feasible. Finally, given (h, ξ) ∈
H × D, let γh(ξ) = ρh(ξ) be the candidate for Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of agent h at node ξ. It
follows that conditions below hold and they assure individual optimality (see Proposition 3 in the
Appendix),
(γh(ξ)pξ, γh(ξ)q(ξ)) = (βt(ξ)ρh(ξ), γh(ξu)q(ξu) + γh(ξd)q(ξd)),∑
{η∈D: t(η)=T}
γh(η)q(η)zh(η) −→ 0, as T → +∞.
By construction, the plan of shadow prices associated to zero short-sales constraints is zero.
Therefore, money has a zero fundamental value and a bubble under Kuhn-Tucker multipliers.
Intuitively, the price of the consumption good is falling at a rate that compensates the intertem-
poral impatience of the agents. Thus, since along the event-tree the purchase power of fiat money
is rising, it is not worthy for agents to have short positions on money and, therefore, binding zero
short-sale constraints do not induce frictions.
Also, the diversity of individuals’ beliefs about the uncertainty (probabilities ρh(ξ)) implies that
both agents perceive a finite present value of aggregate wealth.3 Finally, Assumption 2 is not
satisfied, because aggregated physical endowments were unbounded along the event-tree.4 
3Using agent’ h Kuhn-Tucker multipliers as deflators, the present value of aggregated wealth at ξ ∈ D, denoted
by PV h(ξ), satisfies,
PV h(ξ) =
∑
µ≥ξ
γh(µ)
γh(ξ)
p(µ)W (µ) =
2
ρh(ξ)
∑
µ≥ξ
ρh(µ)βt(µ) +
1
ρh(ξ)
∑
{µ≥ξ:µ∈Dud∪Ddu∪{ξd0}}
ρh(µ)
= 2
βt(ξ)
1− β +
∑
{µ≥ξ:µ∈Dud∪Ddu∪{ξd0}, t(µ)≤t(ξ)+1}
ρh(µ)
ρh(ξ)
+
+∞∑
s=t(ξ)+1
[
1
2s+1
(
1− 1
2s
)
+
(
1− 1
2s+1
)
1
2s
]
= 2
βt(ξ)
1− β +
3
2
1
2t(ξ)
− 1
3
1
4t(ξ)
+
1
ρh(ξ)
∑
{µ≥ξ:µ∈Dud∪Ddu, t(µ)≤t(ξ)+1}
ρh(µ) < +∞.
4If Assumption B holds, there are (κ, pi) ∈ R++×(0, 1) such that, for any ξ ∈ Duu := {µ ∈ D : ∃η ∈ D;µ = (ηu)u},
1
κ
=
wh(ξ)
κ
>
1− pi
βt(ξ)ρh(ξ)
∑
µ>ξ
ρh(µ)βt(µ)W (µ), ∀h ∈ H.
Thus, for all (ξ, h) ∈ Duu ×H, βt(ξ)
(
1
κ(1−pi) +W (ξ)
)
> PV h(ξ). On the other hand, given ξ ∈ Duu,
PV 1(ξ) ≥ 1
ρ1(ξ)
∑
{µ≥ξ:µ∈Dud∪Ddu, t(µ)≤t(ξ)+1}
ρ1(µ) = 1− 1
2t(ξ)+1
.
Therefore, as for any T ∈ N there exists ξ ∈ Duu with t(ξ) = T , we conclude that, βT
(
1
κ(1−pi) + 2
)
> 0.5, for all
T > 0. A contradiction.
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Conclusion
It is well known that, under uniform impatience, positive net supply assets are free of bubbles
for non-arbitrage kernel deflators that yield finite present values of wealth. However, this does not
mean that prices cannot be above the series of deflated dividends for the deflators given by the
agents’ marginal rates of substitution, which also yield finite present values of individual wealth.
In this paper we showed that binding zero short-sales constraints lead to positive prices of fiat
money. These monetary equilibria are Pareto improvements, but they always induce an inefficient
distribution of physical resources.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Lhξ : RL+1 × RL+1 → R ∪ {−∞} be the function defined by
Lhξ (y(ξ), y(ξ−)) = vh(ξ, y(ξ)) − γh(ξ) ghξ (y(ξ), y(ξ−); p, q), where y(ξ) = (x(ξ), z(ξ)) and vh(ξ, ·) :
RL × R→ R ∪ {−∞} is given by
vh(ξ, y(ξ)) =
 uh(ξ, x(ξ)) if x(ξ) ≥ 0;−∞ otherwise.
It follows from Assumption 1 and Euler conditions that, for each T ≥ 0,
∑
ξ∈DT
Lhξ (0, 0)−
∑
ξ∈DT
Lhξ (yh(ξ), yh(ξ−)) ≤ −
∑
ξ∈DT
γh(ξ)q(ξ)(0− zh(ξ)).
Therefore, as for each ξ ∈ D, γh(ξ) ghξ (yh(ξ), yh(ξ−); p, q) = 0, we have that, for any S ∈ N,
0 ≤
∑
ξ∈DS
γh(ξ)
(
p(ξ)wh(ξ) + q(ξ)eh(ξ)
) ≤ lim sup
T→+∞
∑
ξ∈DT
γh(ξ)
(
p(ξ)wh(ξ) + q(ξ)eh(ξ)
)
≤ Uh(xh) + lim sup
T
∑
ξ∈DT
γh(ξ)q(ξ)zh(ξ)
≤ Uh(xh) < +∞,
which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that (yh(ξ))ξ∈D is optimal for agent h ∈ H at prices (p, q).
For each T ∈ N, consider the truncated optimization problem,
(Ph,T )
max
∑
ξ∈DT
uh(ξ, x(ξ))
s.t.
 ghξ (y(ξ), y(ξ−); p, q) ≤ 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT , where y(ξ) = (x(ξ), z(ξ)),(x(ξ), z(ξ)) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT .
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It follows that, under Assumption 1, each truncated problem Ph,T has a solution (yh,T (ξ))ξ∈DT .5
Moreover, the optimality of (yh(ξ))ξ∈D in the original problem implies that Uh(xh) is greater than
or equal to
∑
ξ∈DT u
h(ξ, xh,T (ξ)). In fact, the plan (y˜ξ)ξ∈D that equals to y˜ξ = y
h,T
ξ , if ξ ∈ DT ,
and equals to y˜ξ = 0, if ξ ∈ D \DT , is budget feasible in the original economy and, therefore, the
allocation (yh,T (ξ))ξ∈DT cannot improve the utility level of agent h.
Define vh(ξ, ·) : RL × R→ R ∪ {−∞} by
vh(ξ, y(ξ)) =
 uh(ξ, x(ξ)) if x(ξ) ≥ 0;−∞ in other case.
where y(ξ) = (x(ξ), z(ξ)). Given a multiplier γ ∈ R, let Lhξ (·, γ; p, q) : RL+1 × RL+1 → R ∪ {−∞}
be the Lagrangian at node ξ, i.e.,
Lhξ (y(ξ), y(ξ−), γ; p, q) = vh(ξ, y(ξ))− γ ghξ (y(ξ), y(ξ−); p, q).
It follows from Rockafellar (1997, Theorem 28.3) that there exist non-negative multipliers (γh,T (ξ))ξ∈DT
such that the following saddle point property
(1)
∑
ξ∈DT
Lhξ (y(ξ), y(ξ−), γh,T (ξ); p, q) ≤
∑
ξ∈DT
Lhξ (yh,T (ξ), yh,T (ξ−), γh,T (ξ); p, q),
is satisfied, for each plan (y(ξ))ξ∈DT = (x(ξ), z(ξ))ξ∈DT ∈ RL×D
T
+ × RD
T
+ . Moreover, at each node
ξ ∈ DT , multipliers satisfy γh,T (ξ) ghξ (yh,T (ξ), yh,T (ξ−); p, q) = 0.
Analogous arguments to those made in Claims A1-A3 in Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez
(2008) implies that,
5In fact, as (yh(ξ))ξ∈D is optimal and Uh(xh) < +∞, it follows that there exists a solution for Ph,T if and only
if there exists a solution for the problem,
(P˜h,T )
max
∑
ξ∈DT
uh(ξ, x(ξ))
s.t.

ghξ
(
y(ξ), y(ξ−); p, q
) ≤ 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT , where y(ξ) = (x(ξ), z(ξ)),
z(ξ) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT−1 such that q(ξ) > 0
z(ξ) = 0, if
[
ξ ∈ DT−1 and q(ξ) = 0] or ξ ∈ DT ,
x(ξ) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT .
Indeed, it follows from the existence of an optimal plan which gives finite utility that if q(ξ) = 0 for some ξ ∈ D, then
q(µ) = 0 for each successor µ > ξ. Now, budget feasibility assures that,
z(ξ) ≤ p(ξ)w
h(ξ)
q(ξ)
+ z(ξ−), ∀ξ ∈ DT−1 such that q(ξ) > 0.
As z(ξ−0 ) = 0, the set of feasible financial positions is bounded in the problem (P˜
h,T ). Thus, budget feasible
consumption allocations are also bounded and, therefore, the set of admissible strategies is compact. As the objective
function is continuous, there is a solution for (P˜h,T ).
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Claim. Under Assumption 1, the following conditions hold:
(i) For each t < T ,
0 ≤
∑
ξ∈Dt
γh,T (ξ)
(
p(ξ)wh(ξ) + q(ξ)eh(ξ)
) ≤ Uh(xh).
(ii) For each 0 < t < T , ∑
ξ∈Dt
γh,T (ξ)q(ξ)zh(ξ−) ≤
∑
ξ∈D\Dt−1
uh(ξ, xh(ξ)).
(iii) For each ξ ∈ DT−1 and for any y(ξ) = (x(ξ), z(ξ)) ≥ 0,
uh(ξ, x(ξ))− uh(ξ, xh(ξ)) ≤
γh,T (ξ)p(ξ) ; γh,T (ξ)q(ξ)− ∑
µ∈ξ+
γh,T (µ)q(µ)
 · (y(ξ)− yh(ξ))
+
∑
η∈D\DT
uh(η, xh(η)).
Now, at each ξ ∈ D, wh(ξ) := minl∈L wh(ξ, l) > 0. Also, as a consequence of monotonicity of
uh(ξ), ||p(ξ)||Σ > 0. Thus, item (i) above guarantees that, for each ξ ∈ D,
0 ≤ γh,T (ξ) ≤ U
h(xh)
wh(ξ) ||p(ξ)||Σ , ∀T > t(ξ).
Therefore, the sequence (γh,T (ξ))T≥t(ξ) is bounded, node by node. As the event-tree is countable,
there is a common subsequence (Tk)k∈N ⊂ N and non-negative multipliers (γh(ξ))ξ∈D such that, for
each ξ ∈ D, γh,Tk(ξ)→k→+∞ γh(ξ), and
γh(ξ)ghξ (p, q, y
h(ξ), yh(ξ−)) = 0 ;(2)
lim
t→+∞
∑
ξ∈Dt
γh(ξ)q(ξ)zh(ξ−) = 0 ,(3)
where equation (2) follows from the strictly monotonicity of uh(ξ), and equation (3) is a consequence
of item (ii) (taking the limit as T goes to infinity and, afterwards, the limit in t).
Moreover, using item (iii), and taking the limit as T goes to infinity, we obtain that, for each
y(ξ) = (x(ξ), z(ξ)) ≥ 0,
uh(ξ, x(ξ))− uh(ξ, xh(ξ)) ≤
γh(ξ)p(ξ) ; γh(ξ)q(ξ)− ∑
µ∈ξ+
γh(µ)q(µ)
 · (y(ξ)− yh(ξ)).
It follows that
(
γh(ξ)p(ξ) ; γh(ξ)q(ξ)−∑µ∈ξ+ γh(µ)q(µ)) belongs to the super-differential set of
the function vh(ξ, ·) + δ(·,RL+ × R+) at point yh(ξ), where δ(y,RL+ × R+) = 0, when y ∈ RL+ × R+
and δ(y,RL+ × R+) = −∞, otherwise. Notice that, for each y ∈ RL+ × R+, ς ∈ ∂δ(y,RL+ × R+) ⇔
0 ≤ ς(y′ − y), ∀y′ ∈ RL+ × R+.
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Now, by Theorem 23.8 in Rockafellar (1997), for all y ∈ RL+ × R+, if v′(ξ) belongs to
∂
[
vh(ξ, y) + δ(y,RL+ × R+)
]
then there exists v˜′(ξ) ∈ ∂vh(ξ, y) such that both v′(ξ) ≥ v˜′(ξ) and
(v′(ξ)− v˜′(ξ)) · (x, z) = 0, where y = (x, z). Therefore, it follows that there exists, for each ξ ∈ D,
a super-gradient v˜′(ξ) ∈ ∂vh(ξ, yh(ξ)) such that,γh(ξ)p(ξ) ; γh(ξ)q(ξ)− ∑
µ∈ξ+
γh(µ)q(µ)
− v˜′(ξ) ≥ 0,
γh(ξ)p(ξ) ; γh(ξ)q(ξ)− ∑
µ∈ξ+
γh(µ)q(µ)
− v˜′(ξ)
 · (xh(ξ), zh(ξ)) = 0.
As v˜′(ξ) ∈ ∂vh(ξ, yh(ξ)) if and only if there is u′(ξ) ∈ ∂uh(ξ, xh(ξ)) such that v˜′(ξ) = (u′(ξ), 0),
it follows from last inequalities that Euler conditions hold.
On the other side, item (i) in claim above guarantees that,
∑
ξ∈D γ
h(ξ)(p(ξ)wh(ξ) + q(ξ)eh(ξ)) <
+∞ and, therefore, equations (2) and (3) assure that,
lim
t→+∞
∑
ξ∈Dt
γh(ξ)q(ξ)zh(ξ) ≤ lim
t→+∞
∑
ξ∈Dt
γh(ξ)
(
p(ξ)wh(ξ) + q(ξ)eh(ξ) + q(ξ)zh(ξ−)
)
≤ lim
t→+∞
∑
ξ∈Dt
γh(ξ)q(ξ)zh(ξ−) = 0,
which implies that transversality condition holds.
Reciprocally, it follows from Euler conditions that, for each T ≥ 0,∑
ξ∈DT
Lhξ (y(ξ), y(ξ−), γh(ξ); p, q)−
∑
ξ∈DT
Lhξ (yh(ξ), yh(ξ−), γhξ ; p, q) ≤ −
∑
ξ∈DT
γh(ξ)q(ξ)(z(ξ)−zh(ξ)).
Moreover, as at each node ξ ∈ D we have that γh(ξ)ghξ (yh(ξ), yh(ξ−); p, q) = 0, each budget
feasible plan y = ((x(ξ), z(ξ)); ξ ∈ D) must satisfy∑
ξ∈DT
uh(ξ, x(ξ))−
∑
ξ∈DT
uh(ξ, xh(ξ)) ≤ −
∑
ξ∈DT
γh(ξ)q(ξ)(z(ξ)− zh(ξ)).
Now, as the sequence
( ∑
ξ∈DT
γh(ξ)q(ξ)zh(ξ)
)
T∈N
converges, it is bounded. Thus,
lim sup
T→+∞
− ∑
ξ∈DT
γh(ξ)q(ξ)(z(ξ)− zh(ξ))
 ≤ lim sup
T→+∞
− ∑
ξ∈DT
γh(ξ)q(ξ)z(ξ)
 ≤ 0
Therefore,
Uh(x) = lim sup
T→+∞
∑
ξ∈DT
uh(ξ, x(ξ)) ≤ Uh(xh),
which guarantees that the plan (xh(ξ), zh(ξ))ξ∈D is optimal. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. By Proposition 3, there are, for each agent h ∈ H, non-negative shadow
prices (ηh(ξ); ξ ∈ D), satisfying for each ξ ∈ D,
0 = ηh(ξ)zh(ξ);
γh(ξ)q(ξ) =
∑
µ∈ξ+
γh(µ)q(µ) + ηh(ξ).
Therefore,
γh(ξ)q(ξ) =
∑
µ≥ξ
ηh(µ) + lim
T→+∞
∑
µ∈DT (ξ)
γh(µ)q(µ).
As multipliers and monetary prices are non-negative, the infinite sum in the right hand side of
equation above is well defined because its partial sums are increasing and bounded by γh(ξ)q(ξ).
This also implies that the limit of the (discounted) asset price exists. 
References
[1] Araujo, A., J. Fajardo, and M.R. Pa´scoa (2005): “Endogenous collateral,” Journal of Mathematical Economics,
41, 439-462.
[2] Araujo, A., M.R. Pa´scoa, and J.P. Torres-Mart´ınez (2008): “Long-lived Collateralized Assets and Bubbles,”
Working Paper no 284, Department of Economics, University of Chile. Available at http://www.econ.uchile.cl
[3] Bewley, T. (1980): “The Optimal Quantity of Money,” in Models of Monetary Economics, ed. by J. Kareken
and N. Wallace. Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bank.
[4] Clower, R. (1967): “A Reconsideration of the Microfundations of Monetary Theory,” Western Economic Journal,
6, 1-9.
[5] Gime´nez, E. (2007): “On the Positive Fundamental Value of Money with Short-Sale Constraints: A Comment
on Two Examples,” Annals of Finance, 3, 455-469.
[6] Grandmont, J.M., and Y. Youne`s (1972): “On the Role of Money and the Existence of a Monetary Equilibrium,”
Review of Economic Studies, 39, 355-372.
[7] Grandmont, J.M., and Y. Youne`s (1973): “On the Efficiency of a Monetary Equilibrium,” Review of Economic
Studies, 40, 149-165.
[8] Herna´ndez, A., and M. Santos (1996): “Competitive Equilibria for Infinite-Horizon Economies with Incomplete
Markets,” Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 102-130.
[9] Hahn, F.H. (1973): “On Transaction Costs, Inessential Sequence Economies and Money”, Review of Economic
Studies, 40, 449-461.
[10] Jouini, E., and H. Kallal (1995): “Arbitrage in Security Markets with Short-sales Constraints,” Mathematical
Finance, 5 197-232.
[11] Laibson, D. (1998): “Life-cycle Consumption and Hyperbolic Discount Functions,” European Economic Review,
42, 861-871.
[12] Magill, M., and M. Quinzii (1996): “Incomplete Markets over an Infinite Horizon: Long-lived Securities and
Speculative Bubbles,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 26, 133-170.
[13] Pa´scoa, M.R., M. Petrassi, and J.P. Torres-Mart´ınez (2008): “Fiat Money and the Value of Binding Portfolio
Constraints,” Working Paper Series, 176, Banco Central do Brasil.
FIAT MONEY AND THE VALUE OF BINDING PORTFOLIO CONSTRAINTS 19
[14] Rinco´n-Zapatero, J.P., and M. Santos (2008): “Differentiability of the Value Function without Interiority As-
sumptions,” Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
[15] Rockafellar, R.T. (1997): “Convex analysis,” Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.
[16] Samuelson, P. (1958): “An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance
of Money,” Journal of Political Economy, 66, 467-482.
[17] Santos, M. (2006): “The Value of Money in a Dynamic Equilibrium Model,” Economic Theory, 27, 39-58.
[18] Santos, M., and M. Woodford (1997): “Rational Asset Pricing Bubbles,” Econometrica, 65, 19-57.
[19] Starret, D.A. (1973): “Inefficiency and the Demand for “Money” in a Sequence Economy,” Review of Economic
Studies, 40, 437-448.
Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Travessa Esteva˜o Pinto, 1099-032 Lisbon, Portugal.
E-mail address: pascoa@fe.unl.pt
Central Bank of Brazil
Avenida Presidente Vargas 730, 20071-001 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
E-mail address: myrian.petrassi@bcb.gov.br
Department of Economics, University of Chile
Diagonal Paraguay 257, office 1604, Santiago, Chile.
E-mail address: jutorres@econ.uchile.cl
